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The power of the European Central Bank (ECB) is rooted in its independence 
established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This power is reinforced though the 
bank’s monetary policy credibility—achieved through meeting its price stability 
mandate, whilst resisting political pressures to manipulate monetary policy to other 
ends. This credibility contributes to the ideational power of the ECB which is rooted 
in widespread support for price stability, one of the core objectives of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The ECB’s relative power, as one of the two leading central 
banks in the world, is determined by the relative size of the Euro Area economy and 
the growing importance of the euro as an international reserve currency. The ECB is 
the leading face of the Euro Area abroad and a new and important presence in several 
international economic fora. The ECB is effectively the ‘captain’ of the team of 
Eurosystem (Euro Area) national central banks (NCBs) as well as the wider European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB)—which includes all European Union (EU) NCBs. 
The ECB is responsible for coordinating the policy making of Eurosystem NCBs in a 
range of areas and NCB discussions on inflation forecasts. 
 
However, there are clear limits to the ECB’s power. It controls neither exchange-rate 
policy nor prudential supervision. Limits have been placed upon its international role. 
The ECB must work with governments to build support for low inflationary policies 
and maintain political support EMU. The ECB is one of the most consistent voices in 
favour of structural reform in the European Union (EU), yet there is little the bank can 
do to enforce reform in the short term. Furthermore, the ECB must share many core 
central banking operations with Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs). This 
chapter explores the confines of European Central Bank power. 
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Monetary Policy Power 
 
The basic power of the ECB is to define and implement the monetary policy of the 
Euro Area. The ECB enjoys unrivalled goal-setting and operational independence in 
the pursuit of its price stability goals, and its Governing Council members enjoy ad 
personam independence. The Bank is further sheltered from political interference by 
the need for the unanimous approval of member states to change the Treaty provisions 
on independence. The Statute of the ECB and the ESCB (principally Article 3) sets 
out the tasks of Eurosystem NCBs as: ‘to define and implement the monetary policy 
of the Community’; ‘to conduct foreign exchange operations’; ‘to hold and manage 
the official foreign reserves of the member states’; ‘to promote the smooth operation 
of payment systems’; ‘and to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by 
the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and the stability of the financial system’. The ECB can make regulations (Article 
110(1) TEC), principally with regard to the operation of the ESCB and can impose 
fines or periodic penalty payments for failure to comply with obligations contained in 
its regulations and decisions (Article 110(3)). This competence applies notably with 
regard to the reserves that credit institutions should hold with the ECB and the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions—although the Council of Ministers must 
first establish the broader framework of rules on these matters. 
 
The ECB’s Governing Council (comprising six Executive Board members and, in 
2009, 16 NCB governors) is the monetary policy committee of the Euro Area. It 
formulates the monetary policy of the Eurosystem with the aim of maintaining price 
stability as the Governing Council defines it, including decisions relating to specific 
monetary objectives, monetary strategy, key interest-rates and the supply of 
Eurosystem reserves (Article 12.1, ESCB Statute). The Governing Council adopts the 
internal rules of the ECB and may decide by two-thirds of the votes cast to modify 
operational methods of monetary control. It exercises advisory functions vis-à-vis 
other Community bodies. Moreover, it has the power to form opinions on its own 
initiative on the economic policies adopted by the Community and member state 
governments on matters which fall within its jurisdiction, crucially with regard to the 
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pursuit of ‘stability-oriented’ economic policies.  
 
The six-member Executive Board implements the Eurosystem’s monetary policy—
giving necessary instructions to the NCBs—in accordance with the guidelines and 
decisions established by the Governing Council. It decides upon the precise 
instruments to be used. It also prepares the meetings of the Governing Council. The 
Executive Board may have certain additional powers delegated to it by the Governing 
Council (Article 12, ESCB Statute).  
 
Power and Credibility 
The power of the ECB relies to a large extent upon the credibility and legitimacy of 
its monetary policy (see the chapter by Eichbaum in this volume). Despite widespread 
pessimism about the longevity of EMU and the rapid drop in the value of the euro 
during the first three years of EMU, the ECB has had considerable success in 
achieving credibility thanks to its successful pursuit of its price stability mandate. The 
ECB is frequently seen as the ‘the most predictable central bank’—a virtuous 
reputation in central banking, where controlling expectations about future inflation is 
seen as crucial in increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Its monetary 
strategy was modelled largely on that used by the respected Bundesbank and was 
overseen by Otmar Issing, Chief Economist at the ECB from 1998 to 2006 and former 
director at the Bundesbank. The two-pillar strategy combined an analysis of 
conventional price and growth indicators with money supply and credit data. Many 
economists and central banking officials are sceptical with regard to the analytical 
usefulness of monetary aggregates as a core part of the ECB’s monetary strategy 
(OECD 2007). However, this scepticism has not undermined the credibility of the 
ECB’s policy. The bank has maintained a tight interest-rate policy, successfully 
targeting inflation that is ‘below but close to 2 per cent’ over the medium term, even 
though the actual figure has been frequently just above the target. Yet it appears to 
have been more flexible with regard to M3 growth, which has regularly far exceeded 
the bank’s official reference value of 4.5 per cent.  
During its first decade, the ECB had to deflect regular criticisms of its monetary 
policy from national politicians and economists. Criticism became particularly vocal 
with regard to the strong euro from 2003 and its perceived impact upon exports. The 
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ECB was regularly attacked for its pursuit of low inflation, and its tight monetary 
policy was regularly juxtaposed with the accommodative interest-rate policy and dual 
mandate of the US Federal Reserve—as in the months following the September 2001 
attacks on New York and Washington and following the onset of the credit crunch in 
the autumn of 2007. 
The size of the Euro Area—the second largest economy in the world—and the 
confidence of financial markets in the credibility of ECB monetary policy has 
reinforced the euro’s position as the world’s second international reserve currency. 
There are debates as to the degree to which the euro can challenge the position of the 
US dollar as the leading international reserve currency. However, euro’s present 
position works not only to bolster the position of the ECB as an international actor (in 
the IMF and other international economic fora) but also to strengthen its position in 
relation to national governments and EU institutions in European economic 
governance. 
 
Transparency and Credibility 
In several respects, the ECB lacks transparency compared to the US Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England. Notably, the ECB has opted not to publish its minutes, 
principally for fear that NCB governors would come under pressure at home to justify 
where they had stood in debates. Yet, the ECB has achieved a credibility-enhancing 
transparency with the markets. The ECB president gives the only press conference 
following interest-rate setting meetings, thus avoiding the potential for cacaphony that 
could arise if the NCB governors were allowed this responsibility. Moreover, like the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, the ECB discloses the formal 
macroeconomic model its uses for policy analysis (Eijffinger and Geraats 2005), 
which most economists applaud for reducing private-sector uncertainty about the 
ECB’s policy making process and making monetary policy actions more predictable 
(Geraats 2005 and 2006). There remains criticism of ECB transparency. To many 
economists, its interest-rate setting process and economic analysis remain too opaque 
(OECD 2007: 7).  
 
Limits to ECB power over monetary policy 
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The ECB does not have complete control over all aspects of European monetary 
policy. The Council of Ministers (the Council of Economics and Finance ministers, 
Ecofin) is given limited powers over monetary policy and the management of 
Eurosystem NCBs. These powers are de facto exercised by the Euro Group, 
consisting of the finance ministers of only the member states participating in the Euro 
Area. Lacking a legal personality, the Euro Group must have Ecofin confirm all its 
decisions. The Council can adopt complementary legislation concerning the operation 
of the entire ESCB in a limited number of areas, by qualified majority voting on a 
recommendation from the ECB after consulting the Commission or by unanimity 
acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB (Art. 42 
ESCB statute). In both situations the European Parliament must be consulted. These 
areas include, inter alia: the 'basis for the minimum and maximum reserves to be held 
by national credit institutions with the ECB, and the maximum permissible ratios 
between these reserves, as well as the appropriate sanctions in the case of non-
compliance’ (Art. 19.2); the limits and conditions on any increase to the ECB's capital 
(Art. 28.1); and further calls for foreign reserve assets beyond the limit set in the 
ESCB statute (Art. 30.4). (See Howarth and Loedel (2005) for a more exhaustive list 
and analysis). 
 
Ecofin (the Euro Group) is thus empowered to influence future developments of the 
operation of the ESCB, even though it is unable to modify the objectives or tasks of 
the ESCB or the provisions regarding its independence. It is responsible for setting the 
rate at which currencies of the new Euro Area member states are irrevocably fixed in 
relation to the euro, while the European Council makes the final decision on entry on 
the basis of a recommendation from the Commission. Notably, Ecofin is responsible 
for the establishment of exchange-rate agreements with third countries and has final 
say over most aspects of external monetary policy. However, when performing these 
tasks, Ecofin must consult the ECB, attempt to reach a consensus, and respect the goal 
of price stability. The organization of co-ordination in the area of external monetary 
policy is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
 
Lack of Control over Prudential Supervision 
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During the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference on EMU, it was decided to strongly 
limit the ECB's potential role in the area of prudential supervision. As noted above, 
the Maastricht Treaty grants the Eurosystem NCBs the responsibility ‘to contribute to 
the smooth conduct’ of prudential supervision and the monitoring of financial 
stability. The so-called BCCI Directive (96/25/EC of 29 June 1995) lays the 
foundations for cooperation (exchange of information) but does not contain specific 
provisions or institutional arrangements to this end. The ECB must be consulted on 
the adoption of EC and national legislation relating to prudential supervision and 
financial stability and has the right to perform specific tasks concerning policies 
relating to this supervision. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty establishes a simplified 
procedure (Article 105(6) TEC) that makes it possible, without amending the Treaty, 
to entrust specific supervisory tasks to the ECB. 
 
The precise role of the ECB in prudential supervision remains the subject of ongoing 
debate. It is not unusual that the ECB lacks control over banking supervision, in that 
the central banks in many advanced industrialized countries do not have this power or 
share it with ministries of finance (more often there are completely separate 
institutions responsible for supervision). However, the Euro Area is rather unique in 
that the areas of jurisdiction over monetary policy and over banking supervision—
which remains nationally based—do not coincide. ECB Executive Board members 
thus argue in favour of improved cooperation between Eurosystem central banks 
(including the ECB) and national banking supervisors on the grounds that central 
banks are, because of their responsibilities, necessarily concerned with the health of 
the banking system, and central bank credit control is managed in 'a situation that is 
generated by problems of interest to the supervisor' (Padoa Schioppa 1999a; see also 
Duisenberg 2002; ECB 2001a and b; and Padoa Schioppa 1999b). 
 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision assumed the task of promoting 
cooperation between the ECB, the NCBs and national supervisory authorities. To give 
the EU members of this Committee a more specifically Eurosystem profile, their 
gatherings were officially labelled the Banking Supervision Committee of the ESCB. 
The ECB has sought to develop this cooperation further:  to ensure that the system of 
national supervisors can operate as effectively as a single authority when required, in 
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particular when dealing with local or national banking problems which may have 
wider effects. 
 
ECB Executive Board members tend to argue in favour of transferring full 
supervisory powers to the NCBs rather than centralizing them in the ECB. The 
emphasis placed on the role of NCBs as opposed to the ECB is due in large part to 
their role managing the TARGET payment system, which gives the NCBs much 
greater awareness than the ECB could ever have of the situation of the banks. The 
precise role of the ECB in the handling of solvency crises remains unsettled, and the 
lack of crisis management capacity of the Eurosystem has been criticised (see IMF 
1998). 
 
The 2002 decision by the German government not to grant the Bundesbank full 
control over prudential supervision dealt a blow to hopes of an eventual transfer of 
supervisory powers to NCBs and the ECB (Engelen 2002). In the new Federal 
Agency for Financial Market Supervision, the Germans opted instead for the British 
single regulator model. Shortly, thereafter, the British and Germans further shored up 
the central role of national prudential supervisors by supporting the conclusions of the 
Lamfalussy Committee on the regulation of European securities markets (Quaglia 
2007). The Brown-Eichel plan (subsequently approved by the Council) proposed the 
creation of an umbrella EU financial-sector supervisory body which would seek to 
improve coordination between national regulatory authorities. The creation of such a 
Lamfalussy-style committee structure for banking and insurance markets was a blow 
to the existing ESCB Banking Supervision Committee, and ECB President 
Duisenberg warned that a sideline role of the ECB in bank supervision would risk 
violating the Maastricht Treaty (Engelen 2002). 
 
The ECB asserted the need for its improved control over banking supervision and 
unease at the regulatory arrangements in place during the worsening international 
credit situation of 2007-08. Executive Board members expressed the concern that 
warnings about threats to the Euro Area’s financial systems might not be passed on 
fast enough at times of crisis because of the fragmented regulatory system in the EU 
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and the insufficient cooperation and exchange of information both between 
supervisory authorities in different member states and between them and central 
banks (Stark 2008b). Executive Board members (Bini Smaghi 2008) claimed that the 
effective conduct of the Eurosystem’s liquidity boosting operations from August 2007 
relied upon the ECB’s access to necessary information concerning the liquidity and 
solvency problems of the markets and institutions. They argue that banking 
supervisors needed to strengthen their cooperation to ‘exert strong pressure on 
financial institutions to disclose in a prompt and coherent fashion their balance sheet 
situations’ (ibid). The ECB also argued that member states—Germany has been 
frequently cited—must be required to remove all national legislative obstacles 
preventing supervisors from providing information to the ECB about specific banking 
institutions. 
 
 
A Developing but Limited International Role 
 
Since the Delors Committee began meeting in 1988, there has been debate about the 
role to be played by the ECB in the external representation of the Euro Area in 
international fora. This issue links into the broader problem of the division of 
responsibilities among EU institutions over the major elements of economic policy 
and the respective roles of the Council (Euro Group), the Commission and the ECB in 
external representation (Henning and Padoan 2000; McNamara and Meunier 2002). 
Where the Council represents the Euro Area externally, ECB representatives 
nonetheless engage in the preparation of Euro Area positions for meetings in 
international fora within the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee, prior to these 
positions being finalized in the Euro Group. 
 
The ECB made its initial demands for right to external representation on the basis 
both of Treaty provisions that stipulate that the Community express a single position 
in external monetary policy, and of ESCB Statute provisions (Article 6) that allow the 
ECB to decide how Euro Area NCBs shall be represented by the ECB and/or by Euro 
Area NCBs, on matters falling into its jurisdiction (Padoa-Schioppa 1999c). Thus in 
central banking fora, the participation of the ECB has been straightforward. For 
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example, the ECB president participates in the meetings of the G-10 Governors 
organized in the context of the BIS and in the committees under the aegis of the 
governors, notably the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the Committee 
on the Global Finance System. Eurosystem finance ministers also have an interest in 
ECB participation in intergovernmental fora. For example, the potential success of 
(eventual) international exchange-rate cooperation (under the aegis of the Group of 8 
(G-8)) or concerted intervention in the currency markets relies very much on both ex 
ante and ex post internal Euro Area co-ordination that ensures that the ECB will be 
willing and able to implement the policy bargain. 
 
The ECB’s status at the IMF is limited to that of observer. Its representative attends 
and has the right to speak at meetings on the role of the euro in the international 
monetary system, multilateral surveillance of the Euro Area and individual countries 
within the zone, international capital market reports, and world economic and market 
developments. The ECB has the right to send a representative to Executive Board 
meetings when agenda items are recognised by both the ECB and the IMF to be of 
mutual interest for the performance of their respective mandates. The representative 
can also be invited to other Executive Board meetings, although s/he does not have 
the right to attend. The official Euro Area representative on the IMF Executive Board 
is the Euro Group chair. The ECB also obtained observer status in the meetings of the 
G-10 Ministers and Governors, which are organized in connection with the IMF 
Interim Committee meetings. Although, the ECB's role is limited compared to that of 
the member state governments, its presence may help to unify the views of the EU 
participants on particular matters. Moreover, the ECB’s observer status does not mean 
that it assumes a passive role. ECB and Euro Area NCB representatives have taken 
strong, outspoken positions on major international monetary, financial and other 
economic issues (see Issing 1998 for one early example). 
 
ECB membership of the OECD, another intergovernmental institution, was also out of 
the question. However, the organization deals with issues—notably surveillance of the 
Euro Area—relating to the tasks assigned to the Eurosystem. In February 1999, the 
OECD Secretary General confirmed that the ECB would be allowed to participate in 
the work of the relevant committees and working groups as a member of the EC 
delegation alongside the European Commission. The ECB can make use of its 
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presence in both the IMF and OECD to emphasise the need for on-going structural 
reform in the Euro Area (Stark 2008a). In the G-8, the ECB president replaces Euro 
Area NCB governors during the first part of finance minister meetings when monetary 
matters are discussed. In the G-20, the ECB president attends in addition to the NCB 
governors from the four member states with the largest economies. 
 
The ECB has called for the reinforcement of the ECB’s position in these international 
fora. Duisenberg (2000b) further argued for the gradual but fundamental adaptation of 
the traditional institutional framework of international relations on the grounds that 
the existing framework—based on the representation of national governments—'was 
not tailored to the involvement of monetary unions, nor to the advent of the 
Eurosystem, and more generally the [Euro Area], as a new actor in international 
relations'. With regard to Eurosystem representation in international fora where both 
ministers and bank governors are represented (G-8 Finance, G-20), Duisenberg 
focused on the capability to speak with one voice (if and when appropriate) and a 
clearer Euro Area political counterpart for the ECB. Instead of the four Euro Area 
member state finance ministers (in the G-8 and G-20), he preferred a single Euro 
Group representative with a higher profile. He wanted to overcome the co-ordination 
problems among Eurosystem member states on external monetary policy. 
 
Given the diverse circumstances of bilateral economic relations with third countries, 
the EU finance ministers did not set arrangements for Euro Area representation. The 
presence of the ECB in these bilateral discussions is now left to the Euro Group chair. 
The ECB has forged and reinforced bilateral relations with other central banks on 
issues of mutual concern, including operational facilities, financial stability and the 
provision of technical assistance. Notably, since November 1999 it has become 
involved in the EU enlargement process by providing assistance to the central banks 
of central and eastern European candidate countries to prepare them for participation 
in the ESCB following accession and their eventual participation in the Eurosystem. 
In addition to central banks, the ECB has developed contacts with other relevant 
foreign institutions, such as banking supervisory authorities, local banking 
associations, stock exchanges and national public administrations. 
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Power in Relation to NCBs 
 
The ECB's relatively small Executive Board and its weight on the Governing Council 
(six out of 21 places, or less than third) demonstrates an important feature of the 
Eurosystem. Compared to other federal banking systems, the Eurosystem is relatively 
decentralized:  NCBs have more sway collectively than, say, representatives from the 
Federal Reserve District Banks. This reflects practical reality:  the NCBs are well-
established, whereas the ECB is a fledgling, small institution. Eurosystem NCBs 
perform several operations vital to the operation of the Euro Area:  notably, they 
conduct foreign-exchange operations and ensure the smooth operation of payment 
systems (including TARGET). The NCBs hold and manage the official foreign 
reserves of the member states (of which they can provide up to 40 billion euro to the 
ECB) and hold the capital of the ECB (just under 4 billion euro). However, NCBs 
must follow the regulations, guidelines and instructions of the ECB in these and 
several other areas:  buying and selling securities and other claims; borrowing and 
lending securities; dealing in precious metals; conducting credit operations with banks 
and other financial institutions based on adequate collateral; acting as fiscal agents for 
public entities (although they may not grant them credit facilities or buy their debt 
instruments directly from them). The ECB can also engage in these activities. The 
precise role of the ECB in relation to the NCBs depends on the kinds of open market 
operations selected (with regard to aim, regularity and procedures). NCBs are able to 
perform tasks beyond those specified in the ESCB Statute, except if the Governing 
Council decides that these activities interfere with the work of the ESCB. The ECB 
alone attends Euro Group meetings and Ecofin Councils. However, Eurosystem NCBs 
(and ESCB NCBs) will occasionally attend informal meetings of Ecofin with varying 
degrees of participation as well as meetings of the EU’s Economic and Financial 
Committee when macro-economic policy coordination issues discussed directly 
impinge on them. In 2003, Euro Area NCBs lost their right to sit in Economic and 
Financial Committee meetings—much to the opposition of several NCBs, including 
the Bundesbank (Dyson 2008)—which has reinforced the importance of the ECB in 
European economic governance. 
 
The degree to which the Eurosystem is centralised will develop over time. The 
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committees and the Governing Council) reflects the ongoing importance of the 
analytical—including statistical—resources available in the NCBs and in particular 
the largest. The relative dependence of the ECB on the NCBs has reduced over the 
past decade, nonetheless the US Federal Reserve remains better endowed analytically 
than the ECB and less reliant on the state reserve banks. The importance of the NCBs 
in ECB decision making encourages a combination of collaborative and competitive 
work (Goodfriend 1999; Hochreiter 2000; Mayes 1998 and 2000). In their attempt to 
have an impact on Governing Council decision making, each NCB governor will use 
the resources of his own NCB to provide the necessary information and strengthen his 
position in the on-going debate with other NCBs and the ECB Executive Board on 
appropriate policy and the way that the Euro Area economy works. The development 
of the ECB’s autonomous analytical capacity in relation to that of the NCBs will be 
important in determining the level of centralization in Eurosystem policy making. The 
ECB has already become the most important centre for monetary policy research in 
the EU (see below) hiring some of the best monetary economists from NCBs. 
 
Members of the Governing Council are expected to speak with one voice on the basis 
of the agreed-upon forecasts, although there is no legal requirement to do so. Efforts 
have been made to ensure a tight coordination of official statements on ECB monetary 
policy: the President is spokesperson in the official press conference following the bi-
weekly meetings, while the other members of the Council have to explain Eurosystem 
policy in the member states in their own languages. There have been a number of 
incidents where different NCB governors made ambiguous remarks between 
Governing Council meetings that led to false predictions of monetary policy decisions 
(Louis 2002). However, there has yet to be a publicly expressed substantive difference 
of opinion between members of the Governing Council. Another potential source of 
divergence in the public expression of policy is the separate national forecasts 
published by the independent NCBs. Varying NCB forecasts could send different 
signals to market operators about the development of ECB policy. However, it is the 
role of ECB working groups and committees to iron out differences and ensure 
coherence in all the forecasts of the Euro Area prior to their publication.  
 
The relative importance of the NCBs in the Eurosystem also arguably reflects the 
highly decentralized nature of the EU political system and the problematic legitimacy 
 13 
of the EU in the eyes of many member state citizens. Arguably, European citizens are 
more likely to accept ECB monetary policy if they know that they are represented, 
however indirectly and unofficially, by NCB governors, and that policy is designed in 
the fora of working groups, committees and the Governing Council, where NCB 
experts and officials predominate. This concern was of great relevance to discussions 
in the ECB in 2002-2003 on Governing Council reform in the context of Euro Area 
enlargement (see below). 
 
The ECB Executive Board has been very cautious in its interventions into the 
operation of NCBs. One of the most controversial developments during the first 
decade of EMU was the Banca d’Italia Governor Antonio Fazio's handling of the 
takeover battle for Banca Antonveneta. Despite much criticism, the ECB Executive 
Board initially took a ‘hands-off’ approach and warned of a dangerous precedent for 
ESCB independence if the Italian government used legislation to remove Fazio 
(Financial Times 16 September 2005). The ECB finally adopted a much tougher tone 
in mid-December 2005, after it was made public that Fazio had received gifts from 
the former head of a major Italian bank. President Trichet warned that, in accepting 
gifts, the Italian governor might have breached the ECB's code of conduct (Financial 
Times 17 December 2005). However, the ECB has no investigative powers and was 
unable to pursue matters further. Ultimately, Fazio’s resignation saved the ECB 
further damage to its credibility and the danger of public battles between Governing 
Council members. 
 
 
Independent but in Search of Dialogue 
 
Although the ECB regularly insists upon its independence and directly challenges 
political leaders who call this into question, it needs to maintain a constructive 
dialogue with democratically elected officials. The ECB does this in its dealings with 
the Euro Group of Euro Area finance ministers. The ECB also maintains direct 
relations with the European Parliament (EP), notably in terms of ex-post facto 
reporting and questioning. The EP must be consulted on appointments to the ECB 
Executive Board. It receives and debates the ECB’s annual report and requests that 
the president and other Executive Board members appear before the Committee on 
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Economic and Monetary Affairs (TEC Article 113) (see, for example, Duisenberg 
2000a). Overall, however, the EP has little say over the ECB’s management of 
monetary policy. As Dyson (2000: 69) notes, the model of ECB-EP relations is no 
match for U.S. Federal Reserve–Congress relations, where a well-staffed and financed 
Congressional committee maintains constant scrutiny over the central bank. The ECB 
is not responsible to the EP or other EU institutions; none have the power to dismiss 
ECB Executive Board members on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance in 
fulfillment of the Bank’s own goals (Taylor 2000).  
 
However, there are signs that the ECB has been responsive to the concerns of the 
European Parliament and that a certain form of ECB accountability has developed 
(Magnette 2000; Jabko 2003). While the Treaty and the ESCB Statute establish no 
specific appearance requirements, the EP succeeded in obtaining Duisenberg’s 
agreement that he would appear before the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs four times a year. This accountability has been good for the ECB’s legitimacy. 
The wide-ranging review of the ECB by the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs can ensure that the Bank’s technical decisions are subject to scrutiny from 
beyond the ESCB. This review can increase awareness and widen support for the 
Bank’s underlying policies and principles. Accountability to the EP has also arguably 
induced improvements in ECB transparency, despite the absence of formal disclosure 
requirements (Jabko 2003). For instance, (nonbinding) EP resolutions on the ECB 
Annual Report have repeatedly urged the ECB to be become more transparent, and 
the publication of the ECB’s macroeconomic projections appears to have been 
triggered by the quarterly ‘monetary dialogue’ between the ECB and the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs. 
 
 
Intervention in Government Policy 
 
The ECB has actively promoted structural reforms with the aim of reducing the 
public-sector debt burden, in Governing Council member speeches, press conferences, 
monthly bulletins and annual reports. It has consistently defended the Stability and 
Growth Pact, criticised the suspension of the Excessive Deficit Procedure with regard 
to France and Germany in 2003, and sent strong warnings about the dangers of 
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watering down the Pact in the March 2005 reform (Howarth and Loedel 2004). For 
the ECB, the Pact is a vital tool to entrench a stability culture in the Euro Area and to 
avoid conflictual relations with profligate governments. The ECB’s pro-reform 
agenda has been challenged by government and opposition politicians in several 
member states and labour leaders.  
 
 
Research and Analytical Capacity 
 
Under the leadership of Otmar Issing, who worked as an academic economist for over 
thirty years prior to joining the Bundesbank, the ECB developed an impressive 
research capacity. In addition to its own expanding research staff, the ECB funds a 
visiting researcher programme to attract some of the best monetary economists in the 
world. One of the direct effects of the ECB’s own research capacity was the 
development of the New Area-Wide Model—the principal inflation forecasting model 
—by the staff in DG Research for simulation tasks and scenario analysis. The model 
is also regularly used to produce research papers that are presented in academic 
conferences and central bank workshops, thus providing a constant quality check 
(Trichet 2007). The ECB has funded policy-relevant research that is not yet available 
at universities or other research institutes. With the Centre for Financial Studies at the 
Goethe University of Frankfurt, the ECB runs the Research Network on Capital 
Markets and Financial Integration in Europe. The ECB has also led and co-ordinated 
the research efforts of Eurosystem NCBs through four networks on Monetary 
Transmission, Inflation Persistence, Wage Dynamics, and the Euro Area Business 
Cycle, the latter also involving the Bank of England and the Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. In addition to internal and open seminars given by staff and invited 
speakers, the ECB has become a major venue for conferences on monetary policy and 
other economic matters of direct relevance to monetary policy. The dissemination of 
research at the ECB is achieved through the publication of research papers, 
presentations at international workshops and conferences, and the publication of the 
ECB’s own Working Paper Series. In 2006, 137 working papers were released, with 
90 papers authored or co-authored by ECB staff, considerably more than the output of 
the US Federal Reserve. 
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There were concerns that, following the departure of Issing and with the decision to 
divide the management of Directorate Generals economics and research, the latter 
would lose influence on policy making and resources. However, Lucas Papademos, 
the Executive Board member in charge of DG research since 2006, sought to allay 
fears by directing it ‘to focus more on policy-related issues’ (Financial Times 1 June 
2006). With a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a stint as an 
academic at Columbia University, he has a strong background in academic economic 
research. 
 
 
Internal Reform 
 
Unlike several NCBs in the Eurosystem, which have had to undergo painful internal 
cuts and significant reform, the ECB expanded its staff numbers every year since its 
creation. It remains a comparatively small and efficient central bank. At the end of 
2007, 1375 members of staff (full-time equivalent) were employed on permanent or 
fixed term, up from 1217 staff members at the end of 2003. This number is dwarfed 
by the number employees working in the largest Eurosystem NCBs. However, the 
ECB’s capacities have been increased considerably, and in some areas (notably, 
research) its reputation has overtaken that of the other Eurosystem NCBs. 
 
Despite the ECB’s reputation for efficiency, bank management had to counter a great 
deal of publicly expressed discontent from ECB staff who complained that it suffered 
from poor management, was too bureaucratic, and failed to communicated with its 
employees (Financial Times 5 November 2003). In October 2003, the ECB approved 
internal reforms aimed at improving working conditions, communication with staff 
and management training. A 2003 audit of the bank’s information technology services 
by McKinsey, the consultancy group, found severe management failure in the IT 
department’s project planning, causing heavy budget overruns and major delays 
(ibid.). Trichet dedicated his first years as president to engineering reform throughout 
the bank and, in IT, saw off strikes by staff, who were concerned about the potential 
redundancies resulting from reorganisation.  
 
Euro Area Enlargement and Governing Council Reform 
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The most controversial internal reform undertaken by the ECB was the adoption of a 
new rotation system for voting in the Governing Council. The complicated nature of 
the new system has been criticised by many observers, including the well-known 
monetary economist Daniel Gros (2003). According to the reform agreement, the 
number of NCB governors exercising a voting right is to be capped at 15, while all 
governors are to continue to attend and be able to speak at meetings. When the 
number of NCB governors in the Governing Council exceeds 15 voting rights is to be 
exercised on the basis of a rotation system, designed to ensure that the NCB 
governors with the right to vote are from member states which, taken together, are 
representative of the Euro Area’s economy as a whole. Consequently, the NCB 
governors are to exercise a voting right with different frequencies depending on an 
indicator of the relative size of the economies of their member states within the Euro 
Area. Based on this indicator, NCB governors are be allocated to different groups.  
 
Initially, two rotating groups are established (as took place on 1 January 2009 
following the accession of Slovakia to the Euro Area). The governors from the five 
member states with the largest economies (currently, Germany, France, Italy, Spain 
and the Netherlands) form one group, possessing four votes (and thus each have a 
voting frequency of 80 per cent). The governors from the other member states form 
the second group, sharing eleven votes. Once the total number of member states in the 
Euro Area increases beyond 22, three groups are to be established with members of 
the third group possessing the lowest voting frequency. The members of the 
Executive Board are to preserve their permanent voting rights.  
 
In 2003, the European Parliament opposed the reform on the grounds of its 
complicated nature but also because it was felt that population size should have been a 
factor determining membership of the rotating groups. Many economists and central 
bankers have also attacked the reform because it does not cut down the number of 
Governing Council members, which was already considered to be too many to allow 
for efficient monetary policy making (see for example, Baldwin et al. 2001; Berger et 
al. 2004; Buiter 1999; Eijffinger 2006; and de Haan et al. 2005). Some argue for a 
system emulating the Federal Reserve Board, with the ECB Executive Board 
possessing a larger percentage of the total vote to allow for more efficient policy 
making (de Haan et al. 2005; Eijffinger 2006; Favero et al. 2000). Others see an 
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entirely centralized system—the creation of a Monetary Policy Board detached from 
the member state NCBs—as the only effective way to resolve the efficiency problem 
(Baldwin et al 2001).  
 
It can be argued (see Dyson 2008; Howarth 2007) that concerns with the efficiency 
and credibility of monetary policy making were secondary in the design of the 
rotational groups. More relevant were the corporate interests of the existing twelve 
NCB governors who agreed the reform—none of whom would be placed initially in 
the third group. Moreover, legitimacy concerns may have directed the reform. 
Ensuring representation according to national economic size was potentially 
important to the legitimacy of ECB policy making, even though this undermined the 
treaty-established ad personam status of the NCB governors. At the same time, the 
decision to grant all NCB governors the right to attend and speak at Governing 
Council meetings, and the imposition of rotation—albeit at different frequencies—on 
all governors (from the Maltese to the German), allowed the ECB to claim that the 
reform respects the principle of equal treatment. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
EMU embodies ‘the triumph of technocratic elitism over the idea of political 
democracy’ (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 801). The ECB can be said to be the 
principal victor in terms of real power, determining most aspects of monetary policy 
for the world’s second largest economic entity. The burgeoning research and 
analytical capacity of the ECB has reinforced its power, in relation both to European 
and national political officials and to the Eurosystem’s NCB. Credibility also brings 
power, and the ECB can be judged to have achieved a considerable amount of 
credibility thanks to the consistency of its monetary policy and its ability to adopt 
greater transparency in explaining this policy to both financial markets and 
democratically elected officials.  
 
The democratic legitimacy of the ECB remains contested by some politicians. 
However, Governing Council members insist upon its legitimacy. They argue that the 
ECB’s mandate was established by democratically elected governments and is more 
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tightly circumscribed than a dual mandate including growth and employment 
alongside price stability; that public support for both EMU and the goal of price 
stability remains high; and that the bank has been accountable to democratically 
elected officials and the public—without compromising its independence—through 
the efforts of Executive Board members to explain bank policies regularly to members 
of the European Parliament, governments and the public in speeches, press 
conferences and other public appearances.  
 
The title of this chapter makes direct reference to the title of a much earlier work that 
focuses upon Bundesbank power (Marsh 1992). On 1 January 1999, the ECB 
supplanted the Bundesbank as the leading central bank on the European continent. To 
the extent that we can claim that the ECB ‘rules’ Europe it does so differently than the 
Bundesbank of the era of the European Monetary System. The ECB sets the interest-
rates for fifteen member states, countries in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-2) 
and will have strong influence on interest-rates for those satellite economies whose 
currencies shadow the euro. Yet NCB governors participate in the setting of these 
rates—which was certainly not the case prior to 1999, when the Bundesbank was 
notoriously hostile to interest-rate coordination and set rates to meet its statutory 
mandate of domestic price stability. Even though the ECB’s rates might not be 
entirely appropriate to the economic conditions of many individual Euro Area 
member states, they are not the reflection of economic developments in a single 
member state. The ideational power of the ECB is at least as great as that of the 
Bundesbank: the former is the guardian of price stability in Eurosystem and one of the 
world’s most visible promoters of the virtues of low inflation. The augmentation of 
the ECB’s research capacity reinforces its ideational power and it is supported by the 
Eurosystem NCBs which all share the same mandate. However, the Bundesbank’s 
influence lay not only in its success in maintaining low inflation but also, to a large 
extent, on the comparative size and strength of the German economy. The ECB 
manages the monetary policy of a far larger economic entity—clearly a source of its 
great clout both at home and abroad—but the Euro Area is, in its great diversity, less 
economically successful than pre-unification Germany, a fact that inevitably 
undermines the power of the ECB’s anti-inflationary message.  
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This chapter has shown that the power of the ECB is limited in several important 
respects. The resistance of member state governments limits the ECB’s influence in 
European economic governance, national macroeconomic policy and prudential 
supervision. Despite the ECB’s important international profile, EU member states are 
unlikely to modify its observer status in the IMF and OECD. The resistance of Euro 
Area NCBs also prevents the extension of ECB activities into several core central 
banking operations. International developments—and notably the rise of China and 
India—will both limit the relative economic importance of the Euro Area and, 
eventually, the importance of the euro as an international reserve currency. 
Increasingly complicated financial markets—notably the rise of derivatives and hedge 
funds—have potential to further undermine the credibility of ECB monetary policy.  
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